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the opposing party.1 In the instant case, the peculiar sequence
of pooling arrangements was sufficient to convince the court that
plaintiffs were not aware of the facts. Consequently, it seems
clear that the legal principles applied by the court are well
grounded in the Louisiana jurisprudence. Although this case
was compromised pending decision on the application for rehearing, it is an expression of judicial thought on the lease
clause involved and can serve as a guide for future action to
all parties interested in mineral operations.
William D. Brown III

SALES-REDHIBITORY AcTIoN-ACTION FOR BREACH OF CONTRACTDIFFERENCE IN PRESCRIPTIVE PERIODS

Plaintiff purchased paint from defendant which defendant
had advertised as "guaranteed 100% Mold and Mildew-Resistant
All-Purpose White Paint." Plaintiff used the paint on his own
house and on another. Within less than a year after application
of the paint mildew appeared on both houses. Suit was brought
to recover the cost of the paint and the expenses incurred in its
application and removal. The trial court held that the action was
one in redhibition and, since the suit had been instituted more
than two years after the date of the sale and more than one year
after the discovery of the defects and deficiences in the paint, the
defendant's plea of prescription was sustained. On appeal, plaintiff urged that the controversy was not controlled by the oneyear rule of prescription applicable to the action of redhibition,
but instead by that of ten years since the action was to recover
damages for breach of contract. The Orleans Court of Appeal
stated that "the Supreme Court must still be of the view that
...this is a redhibitory action," and held, affirmed. "[I]n such
a case as this, the party who sustains loss is entitled to 'damages'
but . ..those damages are such as are contemplated by Article
2545 of the Civil Code ....
[C]onsequently the claim is barred
by the prescription period of one year in accordance with Article
2534, if the seller did not know of the defect, or Article 2546 if the
10. Harvey v. Richard, 200 La. 97, 7 So.2d 674 (1942); Hayward v. Carolina Ins. Co., 51 So.2d 405 (La. App. 1951). Ratification, while not entirely
equitable In nature, must include an intent to confirm, and therefore -re-

quires knowledge of all facts surrounding the questioned transaction. Art.
2272, LA. CIVIL CODE of 1870; Otis v. Texas Co., 153 La. 384, 96 So. 1 (1923);

Lacaze v. Kelsoe, 185 So. 676 (La. App. 1939).
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seller had such knowledge."' Walton v. Katz & Besthoff, Inc., 77
So.2d 563 (La. App. 1955).
Under the Civil Code the redhibitory action lies when the
object sold has some vice or defect.2 It is also made applicable by
the Code to a false declaration of quality.3 The action entitles
the buyer either to reject the thing sold and obtain restitution of
the price paid and the expenses of the sale 4 or to keep the thing
and obtain a reduction of the price.5 He may claim damages only
when the seller has knowingly failed to disclose vices or defects7
in the thing6 or has intentionally misrepresented its qualities.
On the other hand when a breach of contract occurs, the buyer
may obtain damages.8 The good or bad faith of the seller affects
only the amount of the recovery. 9 A buyer's right to recover
damages against a good faith seller therefore will depend upon
whether the action is treated as one in redhibition or as one for
breach of contract. The distinction between these two actions is
also important because of the different prescriptive periods applicable to each action.'0 Under the Civil Code of 1808 no distinction was made between good faith and bad faith declarations of
quality." The seller could be forced to respond in damages,
"according to circumstances," whether his declarations were
made in good .or bad faith.' 2 Thus, as to declarations of quality,
1. 77 So.2d 563, 566 (La. App. 1955). It is submitted that the cited language may be misleading. Damages can be recovered only when the seller
has knowledge of the defect.
2. Arts. 2520, 2521, 2522, LA. CIVIL CODE of 1870. The action cannot be instituted for vices or defects perceivable on simple inspection or which were
revealed to the seller before or at the time of the sale. Further, they must
be such as to render the object absolutely useless, or its use so inconvenient
and imperfect that it must be supposed that the buyer would not have purchased it if he had known of the vice. For a general discussion, see Comment, The Nature of the Redhibitory Action, 4 TUL. L. REV. 433 (1930).
3. Arts. 2529, 2547, LA. CIVIL CODE of 1870. Although a declaration of quality is not a vice, it is made subject to the redhibitory action if the reliance of
the buyer thereon was the principal motive for making the purchase.
4. Art. 2531, LA. CIVIL CODE of 1870.
5. Art. 2541, LA. CIVIL CODE of 1870. But note especially article 2543, which
makes the action for reduction of the price a bar to a further suit in redhibition. That article also provides that the judge has discretionary powers
to order a reduction in the price in the redhibitory action. Article 2544 provides that the rules of redhibition will govern the action for a reduction of
the price.
6. Art. 2545, LA. CIVIL CODE of 1870. The prescriptive period in this case
will not begin to run until discovery of the vice. Art. 2546, LA. CIVIL CODE of
1870.
7. Art. 2547, LA. CIVIL CODE of 1870.
8. Arts. 1926, 1927, 1928, LA. CIVIL CODE of 1870.
9. Art. 1934(1), (2), LA. CIVIL CODE of 1870.
* 10. Arts. 2534, 2546, 3544, LA. CIVIL CODE of 1870.
11. LA. CIVIL CODE of 1808, 3.6.81, p.-.360.
12. Ibid.
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it was not important to distinguish between the redhibitory
action and the action for breach of contract, aside from the difference in the prescriptive periods. It was only through the revision of the articles on redhibition by the re.dactors of the Civil
Code of 1825 that it became important in considering a claim for
damages whether or not declarations of quality were made in
good or bad faith. 13 The revised articles remain unchanged in
our present Civil Code. In deciding which action should apply,
little difficulty is encountered in determining what constitutes a
vice or defect giving rise to the redhibitory action. Great difficulty does arise, however, in determining what constitutes a
declaration of quality, giving rise to the redhibitory action, as
distinguished from a descriptive statement identifying the object
to be delivered under the terms of the contract and resulting in
a primary obligation. No rules are provided in the Civil Code to
help in making this distinction. At common law similar problems are discussed in terms of condition and warranty. 14 If the
declaration constitutes a promise which must be fulfilled in order
to render enforceable the promise of performance given in return, the declaration is called a condition precedent.' 5 A warranty, on the other hand, is defined as "an agreement with reference to goods which are the subject of a contract of sale but
collateral to the main purpose of such contract."' 6 The seller's
failure to comply with a condition precedent entitles the buyer
13. Projet of the Civil Code of 1825, 1 LA. LEGAL ARCHIVES 308, 311
(1937); see Compiled Edition of the Civil Codes of Louisiana, 3 LA. LEGAL
ARCHIVES 1399 (1942). The redactors of the Code said of the change: "This
section is remoulded entirely, and although the principles contained in it
remain the same, and there are few additional provisions, yet we think
that the matter is here presented with more order and clearness." Projet of
the Civil Code of 1825, supra, at 308.
14. BENJAMIN, SALE 553 et seq. (8th ed. 1950); CORBIN, CONTRACTS §§ 14, 622
et seq., 639 et seq., 1101 (1951); 1 WILLISTON, SALES § 178 et seq. (rev. ed. 1948);
Brown, The Laws of Sales in the United States, 8 COLUM. L. REv. 82 (1908);
Burdick, Conditions and Warranties in the Sale of Goods, 1 COLUM. L. REV.
71 (1901); Costigan, Conditions in Contracts, 7 COLUM. L. REV. 151 (1907);
Hill, Conditions and Warranties, 1 RES JUDICATAE 146 (1935-38); Morrow, Warranty of Quality: A Comparative Survey, 14 TUL. L. REV. 327 (1940); Rabel,
The Nature of Warranty of Quality, 24 TUL. L. REV. 273 (1950); Stoljar, The
Contractual Concept of Condition, 69 L.Q. REv. 485 (1953); Stoljar, Conditions,
Warranties and Descriptions of Quality in Sale of Goods-I, 15 MODERN L.
REv. 425 (1952); Williston, Rescission for Breach of Warranty, 16 HARV. L.
REV. 465 (1903); Williston, What Constitutes an Express Warranty in the Law
of Sales, 21 HARV. L. REV. 555 (1908); Note, 21 MICH. L. REV. 478 (1923); Recent
Cases, 71 So. Aim. L.J. 333 (1955).
15. BENJAMIN, SALE 553, 554, 555 (8th ed. 1950); 3 CORBIN, CONTRACTS §§
626 et seq., 639 et seq. (1951); 1 WILLISTON, SALES §§ 178, 179, 180 (rev. ed. 1948).
16. 1 WILLISTON, SALES § 181 (rev. ed. 1948); see BENJAMIN, SALE 553 et seq.
(8th ed. 1950),
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to reject the goods and sue for damages.1" Although a breach of
warranty entitles the buyer to damages, it does not give him the
right to reject the goods.' The problem at common law of determining when a particular stipulation is a warranty or a condition,
therefore, is similar to the Louisiana problem of determining
when the redhibitory action or action for breach of contract lies.
Rules developed by common law authorities to aid in making this
distinction may be helpful in applying Louisiana law. 19 Professor Williston, in discussing the English law of warranty, mentions three questions which may be asked, two of which will be
the basis of this discussion: (1) Was the statement made as to
specific goods? (2) Was the statement collateral to the principal
undertaking? 20 Where the parties are dealing with specific goods,
any declaration concerning the quality of the goods is collateral
to the principal obligation to deliver the goods in question. Such
a declaration therefore is a warranty and not a condition. Even
where the parties are not dealing with specific goods, a statement
by the seller that the goods possess a certain quality is a warranty
and not a condition, unless the absence of the quality makes the
thing delivered different in kind from that described in the contract. 21 Delivery of goods not of the kind described in the contract is a breach of the principal, not a collateral, undertaking.
Delivery of goods generally answering the description, on the
other hand, but not of the quality contracted for constitutes only
a breach of warranty. It would seem that each case must be
judged on its own facts. In England and the various American
jurisdictions, the distinction between conditions and warranties
is no longer important.2 2 In England, the courts distinguish between conditions and warranties on the basis of the parties'
"intentions" and without an exact formula.23 In the majority
of the American jurisdictions the principles of warranty have
17. BENJAMIN, SALE 555 (8th ed. 1950); 5 CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 1114 (1951);
1 WILLISTON, SALES § 181 (rev. ed. 1948).
18. BENJAMIN, SALE 555 (8th ed. 1950); 1 WILLISTON, SALES § 181 (rev. ed.
1948).
19. See particularly BENJAMIN, SALE 555-56 (8th ed. 1950); 1 WILLISTON,
SALES

§§ 182-85

20. 1

(rev. ed. 1948).
SALES § 182 (rev. ed. 1948).

WILLISTON,

His third question relates

to executory contracts and is not pertinent here. It should be noted that
Williston does not approve of this approach, but favors abolition of the distinction. But see discussion in BENJAMIN, SALE 609 et seq. (8th ed. 1950).
21. See 1 WILLISTON, SALES § 184 (rev. ed. 1948), citing Bailhache, J., in
Harrison v. Knowles, [1917] 2 K.B. 606.
22. 1 WILLISTON, SALES § 184 (rev. ed. 1948); see references in note 24 infra.
23. 1 WILLISTON, SALES § 183 (rev. ed. 1948); see Brown, The Law of Sales
in the United States, 8 COLUM. L. REV. 82, 86 (1908); Morrow, Warranty of
Quality: A Comparative Survey, 14 TUL. L. REV. 327, 340 (1940).
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been altered so that now, even for breach of warranty, a buyer
may reject the goods and obtain damages. 24 Furthermore, the
Uniform Sales Act 25 and the Uniform Commercial Code 26 provide that the seller "expressly warrants" that the goods sold by
description will comply with the description given. As to declarations of quality, the same result appears to have been possible
under the Louisiana Civil Code of 1808. The change in the Civil
Code of 1825,27 however, created a problem for the Louisiana
courts which has been avoided in most jurisdictions. The French
Code Civil contains no provision relating to declarations of
quality about the object sold. Only in dealing with warranty in
case of eviction does it mention that the "parties may by particular agreement add to the obligation of warranty . . .or diminish
its effect. ' 28 The French commentators do not elaborate on this
provision. 29 They merely mention that the "absence of quality
does not give rise to the redhibitory action, ' ' 30 without going into
the question what its legal consequences are. The Spanish C6digo
Civil of 1889 follows the French Code Civil and there is the same
lack of discussion concerning declarations of quality in the
Spanish treatises. 31 The answer to the silence of the French
24. 1 WILLISTON, SALES § 184 (rev. ed. 1948); see Brown, The Law of Sales
in the United States, 8 COLUM. L. REV. 82, 85 (1908); Morrow, Warranty of
Quality: A Comparative Survey, 14 TUL. L. REV. 327, 338 et seq. (1940); Rabel,
The Nature of Warranty of Quality, 24 TUL. L. Rsv. 273, 284 et seq. (1950).
25. UNIFORM SALES ACT § 14; see references in note 24 supra.
26. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-313(1)(b).
27. See note 13 supra.
28. CODE CIVIL art. 1627, which is identical with Art. 2503, LA. CIVIL CODE

of 1870.
29. 10

PLANIOL ET RIPERT,

TRAITA

PRATIQUE

DE DROIT CIVIL

FRAN(AIS

no

121

(1932), e.g., is of the opinion that such guarantees, although they are very
common in sales contracts, are at times formulated so vaguely as not to
add or subtract from the warranty of the Code. It seems that the French

jurisprudence deals with the non-compliance with declarations of quality
under the aspect of fraud and error. Cf., e.g., 10 PLANIOL ET RIPERT, TRAITt
PRATIQUE DE DROIT CIVIL no 126 (1932); Note, 10 TUL. L. REV. 147, 149 (1935).
30. See, e.g., 11 BEUDANT, COURS DE DROIT CIVIL FRANgAIS no 253 (2d ed. 1938),

translated in

SMITH,

LOUISIANA

AND

COMPARATIVE

MATERIALS

ON

SALES

AND

LEASES 176 (1954).
31. In the Spanish translation of 2 ENNECCERUS, KIPP & WOLFF, TRATADO
DE DERECHO CIVIL 59-60 (2d ed. 1950), annotated by Spanish editors, we find express statements that the Spanish civil law, as distinguished from the German law, "does not provide for the case where the thing lacks the qualities
declared by the seller" (author's translation) and the question what the legal

consequences in this case should be is merely raised without any indication
of how the Spanish law would treat this situation. The new Civil Code of
the Philippines, a revision of the Spanish C6digo Civil of 1889, arts. 1545-47,
is based on the language of the Uniform Sales Act and has completely eliminated the civil law terminology. 3 GARCIA & ALBA, CIVIL -CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES 1767-79 (1952).
The new Italian Codice Civile of 1942 contains a special article, 1497,
concerning defects in quality which permits "cancellation of the contract in
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treatises as to the legal consequences of the absence of declared
qualities seems to lie in the fact that according to the constant
jurisprudence of the French cour de cassation the interpretation
of contracts is within the "sovereign" discretion of the trial
32
judge.
In the instant case, the plaintiff apparently believed that the
statements of the defendant and the advertisements in the local
newspapers that the "paint was perfect for the New Orleans cli33
mate and would prevent mold and mildew from forming"
amounted to a contractual undertaking by the defendant. His
contention seems to have been that the delivery of paint that
would not prevent mold and mildew was a failure on the part
of the defendant to deliver the kind of goods he had contracted
to sell. In support of this contention the plaintiff cited Henderson
v. Leona Rice Milling Co., 34 where the Supreme Court had treated
a delivery of mixed rice under a contract calling for "pure Honduras rice" as a breach of contract. He also relied upon Rapides
Grocery Co. v. Clopton. 35 In that case the court applied the oneyear prescription for redhibitory actions and rejected the buyer's
claim for the profits lost when soy beans sold to him failed to
germinate. The court in the instant case concluded that the
Henderson case had actually been decided on principles of redhibition. Relying on this assumption, the court concluded that
since the principles involved in the Henderson and Rapides Groaccordance with the general provisions relative to discharge of a contract

by non-performance, provided such defect in quality exceeds the limits for
which allowance is made by custom." However, the article expressly subjects
the rights arising under it to the prescriptive period of one year for warranty
actions. The article was originally designed to cover defects in machinery,
instruments, and appliances, but was broadened to cover all declared qualities. See [ROYAL COMMISSION FOR THE REFORM OF THE CODES-SUBCOMMISSION FOR
THE CIVIL CODE], CODICE CIVILE: QUARTO LIBRO,
ZIONE AL PROGETTo 48 (1939)
32. 1 RABEL, DAs REcHT ,DES WARENKAUFS

OBBLIOAZIONI E CONTRATTI-RELA196 (1936),

in

his discussion of

the collateral obligations of the vendor under French law, cites the jurisprudence constante of the French cour de ceassation to this effect and the treatises of Planiol et Ripert and Josserand. The second part of Rabel's treatise
which will contain a discussion of warranty for vices has not yet appeared.
It is to be published this year.
33. 77 So.2d 563, 564 (La. App. 1955).
34. 160 La. 597, 107 So. 459 (1926).
35. 171 La. 632, 131 So. 734 (1930). The buyer's claim was by way of a
reconventional demand filed in an action by the seller to obtain the price of
cottonseed previously sold to the defendant. The plaintiff in the instant case
contended that the court should recognize that the suit could have been
decided on grounds of breach of contract. Since in each case there had been
express and implied warranties that the products had such qualities, the
plaintiff apparently felt that the failure of the seed to germinate was similar
in result to the failure of the paint in his case to prevent mold and mildew.
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cery Company cases were substantially the same the latter case
case
was correctly decided. 36 It is submitted that the Henderson
37
contract.
of
breach
for
action
an
as
was properly decided
In neither the Henderson nor the Rapides Grocery Company
case does it appear that the contracting parties had dealt with a
specific object. In both cases, therefore, the court had to determine whether there was a failure to deliver goods of the kind
contracted for or whether there was merely an absence of some
declared quality or presence of some vice or defect in the thing
sold. In the Henderson case the court found that the obligation
of the seller was to deliver "pure Honduras rice" and concluded
that the delivery of mixed rice was a breach of contract. This
conclusion was sound because the goods delivered were of a kind
different from those agreed upon. In the Rapides Grocery Company case the obligation of the seller was to deliver soy beans.
The buyer claimed that there was an express and implied warranty that the beans would germinate. 38 Since the principal obligation of the seller was to deliver soy beans, the guarantee that
the soy beans would germinate was only collateral and therefore
governed by the rules relating to redhibition.39 In the instant
36. The court apparently felt that it should reconcile the Henderson and
Rapides Grocery Company cases. By finding that the Henderson case was
decided under redhibition principles and by pointing to the language in the
Rapides Grocery Company case that the reconventional demand for damages
was barred by the prescription of one year the court apparently felt that
it had accomplished its objective. It rationalized its conclusion by stressing
that the Rapides Grocery Company case was decided only four years after
the Henderson case and that the author of the opinion in the Henderson case
had acquiesced in the Rapides Grocery Company decision. 77 So.2d 563, 566

(1955).
37. The court was not impressed by the statement in the Henderson case
that the action could not be one in redhibition since the plaintiff could not
return the rice. It stated that even where the object cannot be returned
there are instances in which the redhibitory action will lie. Although this
conclusion may be correct and the reasoning in the Henderson case faulty,
the court in the instant case erred in holding that the Henderson case was
decided under redhibition principles. The decision before us was based on
the discussion in the Henderson case to the effect that the prescriptive period
for redhibition was applicable. 77 So.2d 563, 565 (La. App. 1955). It appar-

ently overlooked the fact that this discussion followed the holding that the
action was one for breach of contract and the statement that it was not
important on what grounds the action was decided. The Supreme Court in
the Henderson case felt that it was not important because the action was
filed timely under either theory and because the defendant was in bad faith,
which permitted the recovery of damages. 160 La. 597, 602, 107 So. 459, 460
(1926). Consequently, although the court in the instant case may have been
correct in declaring that the Rapides Grocery Company case was properly
decided on grounds of redhibition, its reasons for so concluding are of doubtful validity.
38. 171 La. 632, 634, 131 So. 734, 735 (1930).
39. For an excellent comparison of similar cases decided on the same
grounds at common law, see Burdick, Conditions and Warrantiesin the Sale
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case the contractual undertaking of the seller was to deliver the
specific paint in question. The paint was declared to be mold and
mildew resistant. As it was proved not to be mold and mildew
resistant, the declaration of quality was false. Since a false
declaration of quality gives rise to the redhibitory action, the
court's application of the one-year prescription rule seems
correct.
Charles M. Lanier

SECURITY DEVICES-SURETYSHIP-DEFIcIENcY JUDGMENT ACT
The defendant Scheen purchased an automobile from a
corporation whose president and principal stockholder was the
defendant Mingledorff. Scheen borrowed the purchase price
from the plaintiff bank. As security for this loan Scheen executed a note to the plaintiff. The note was endorsed by Mingledorff and secured by a chattel mortgage on the automobile.
When Scheen defaulted, Mingledorff persuaded him to sign an
instrument requesting the plaintiff to repossess the automobile
and sell it at private sale in order to avoid the cost and expense
of a public sale. By the terms of this instrument, prepared by
Mingledorff, Scheen as its signer agreed to waive appraisement
and pay the plaintiff bank any deficiency after the sale. After
the private auction sale, plaintiff sued for a deficiency judgment
in solido against Scheen, the maker of the note, and Mingledorff,
its endorser. The trial court held that Scheen was discharged
from liability by the terms of the Deficiency Judgment Act,'
and that Mingledorff was discharged from liability by the terms
of Civil Code article 3061,2 because, as surety, he was prevented
of Goods, 1 COLUM. L. REV. 71 (1901). Similar English cases are found in
BENJAMIN, SALE 616 et seq. (8th ed. 1950). See illustrations in 1 WILLISTON,
SALES 180 and discussion at § 225 et seq. (rev. ed. 1948).
1. LA. R.S. 13:4106 (1950): "In any case where any mortgagee or other
creditor takes advantage of the waiver of appraisement of the debtor and
provokes a judicial sale, without the benefit of appraisement, of the encum-

bered property, whether real or personal, or of both characters, and the
proceeds of such sale are insufficient to satisfy the debt for which the
property is sold, the debt nevertheless shall stand fully satisfied and dis-

charged, . . . and such mortgagee or other creditor shall not thereafter
have the right to proceed against the debtor or any other of his property
for such deficiency, in any manner whatsoever."
LA. R.S. 13:4107 (1950): "R.S. 13:4106 declares a public policy and the
provisions thereof can not, and shall not be waived by a debtor ....
2. The article provides: "The surety is discharged when by the act of

the creditor, the subrogation to his rights, mortgages and privileges can
no longer be operated in favor of the surety."

